Wednesday, May 1, 2013

William Lane Craig vs Alex Rosenberg – Is faith in God reasonable?



I watched the video of the debate between William Lane Craig and Alex Rosenberg over the question “Is Faith in God Reasonable?” Here are some of my thoughts from watching the debate.

1. We argue about whether faith in God is reasonable as if we are trying to provide an apology for it. It is as if having faith in God is prima facie unreasonable, and the effort expended by the apologist is to reverse this impression and show that it is reasonable for one to profess a faith in God. But why is it prima facie unreasonable? As always, the problem of evil and suffering comes to mind. I thought Rosenberg gave an evincing description of such a circumstance where choosing to have faith in God is repulsive to common sense, where the feeling of the absence of God seems so profoundly acute that it weighs upon the minds of the common man that God simply does not exist. Alex Rosenberg shared his testimony of how he lost members of his family from the brutality in the holocaust.

What do I feel about the reply given by William Lane Craig that there we are unable to know whether there are morally sufficient reason for God to allow evil and suffering? I don’t like questions to be excluded on the basis that we cannot go about evaluating it. It is certainly debatable whether a question about moral sufficient reason for allowing evil and suffering can be evaluated. One reason that apologists would give is that God would correct and make everything right in the end. But it is still debatable whether this is a morally sufficient reason.

What does it mean to have faith in God? Here in this debate, faith in God is defined as simply a belief in the existence of God. Craig did acknowledge after the debate how ‘faith’ can have a more extensive definition such as encompassing a trust in someone, or committing one’s life to someone. I was wondering whether faith in God in such respect becomes more difficult to be evaluated as being reasonable as compared to the type of faith that is just a propositional belief in the existence of God. So while the theist can still reasonably believe that God exists in arduous circumstances of suffering such as the holocaust, is it still reasonable for him to put his trust in God to protect him and his loved ones?

2. There was one part of the debate where William Lane Craig talked about how ‘intentional states of consciousness in the world’ refutes the philosophy of naturalism. I didn’t quite understand how this argument works. Craig said, “Philosophers are puzzled about states of intentionality. Intentionality is the property of being about something or of something. It signifies the object directedness of our thoughts. For example, I can think about my summer vacation or I can think about my wife. No physical object has this sort of intentionality. A chair, or a stone, or a glob of tissue like the brain is not about or of something else. Only mental states or states of consciousness are about other things. As a materialist, Dr Rosenberg recognizes this fact and so concludes that on atheism, there really are no intentional states…but this is incredible. Obviously, I am thinking about Dr Rosenberg’s argument. This seems to me to be a reduction ad absurdum of atheism. By contrast on theism, because God is a mind, it’s hardly surprising that there should be finite minds. Thus, intentional states fit comfortably into a theistic world view.”

I think that it comes back to a question of what is the nature of the mind. Is the mind physical or non-physical? I feel that it is inadequate to assume that the mind is non-physical in nature. At the same time, there also seems to be something inadequate about seeing the mind as simply a physical construct known as the brain. One thing is for sure, without the brain, there is no consciousness. But why do I experience the consciousness that I do because of my brain?

3. Rosenberg disputes the cosmological argument that William Lane Craig usually gives for his argument for the existence of God. Alex Rosenberg spoke about how the indeterminate nature of quantum mechanics shows that the universe does not need to have a cause. He gave the example of how two similar uranium nuclei each emit protons at different time despite the similarity of their physical structures.

Craig disputed the example of the quantum mechanics as a case in point of indeterminacy. He talked about how there are many theories in the field of science on how quantum mechanics work, some of them deterministic in nature.

Some people criticize apologetics method based on the incompleteness of science in the present to explain how certain things work in order to prove the existence of God as the ‘god of the gaps’ argument. They feel that the answer that God must be the cause seems to be a cop-out. For me, I think the answer that God is or must be a cause is a viable consideration to make, although this answer is defeasible. But there must be worthy grounds upon which to make this argument that God, and not something else, is the cause.

Hearing all these scientific arguments reminds me of my junior college days where I was in the science stream and studied physics for one of my subjects. Quantum mechanics was indeed one of the most interesting topic for the physics subject. The part which really intrigued me most was about how light has two natures - a wavelike nature, and a particle nature. Yet, it behaves distinctly as one or the other depending on how it is observed. When scientist tries to observe it for its particle nature, it loses its wavelike property, and vice versa. I was wondering why light seems to have a mind of its own as to be aware of how it is being observed. I was apt to believe that this curious property of light is a product of intelligent design, but perhaps this curious property of quantum mechanics doesn’t really say anything.

4. I like how Alex Rosenberg pointed out at the beginning how he felt that the adversarial debate style is not conducive for the discussion of philosophical matters, which he felt should be more consultative and inquisitorial in nature. His thought that philosophers should not seek to argue simply so as to win the debate, as much as they should seek to interlock with each other and find out the truth of the matter.

I thought it was an interesting issue to think about. What is the best format to take for the evaluation of truth? I thought that the court room trial format could be useful and productive, and make evaluation of the debate much clearer to the audience as well. We have the proponent present his case. His opponent will then cross-examine his case, or specific propositions in his case. He can then explain away the apparent weaknesses, or reframe his case. And just like in a court room trial where we can have ‘trials within a trial’ to determine specific issues of facts relevant to establishing the charge, there can be something similar for a debate.

Speaking of which, what is the best format that the court of law should use to adjudicate matters? Can the format be improved? I think these are questions worth considering by law professionals.

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